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Software productivity: potential, actual, 
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Tarek K. Abdel-Hamid and Stuart Madnick 
In this article, we in- 
vestigate the dynam- 
ics of software devel- 
opment productivity 
throughout the soft- 
ware development 
lifecycle. Our inves- 
tigation discerns 
three forms of pro- 
ductivity, namely, 
potential, actual, and 
perceived. This con- 
ceptual dissection of 
productivity pro- 
vides a useful lens 
for focusing on two 
distinct sets of man- 
agerial concerns: 
losses in  the effi- 
ciency of software 
production, and 
losses in the effec- 
tiveness of manage- 
rial control. Losses 
in production effi- 
ciency stem from 
faulty processes as- 
sociated with moti- 
vation and commu- 
nication and lead to 
a gap between poten- 
tial productivity and 
actual productivity. 
Losses in the effec- 
tiveness of manage- 
rial control arise, 
particularly in the 
early stages of a soft- 
ware project, from 
the discrepancy be- 
tween what manage- 
ment perceives pro- 
ductivity to be and 
what it actually is. 
The impressive improvements being made in the cost effectiveness of computer 
hardware are causing an enormous expansion in the number of applications for which 
computing is becoming a feasible and economical solution. This, in turn, is creating 
greater and greater demands for the development and operation of computer software 
systems. A conservative estimate suggests a hundredfold increase in the demand for 
software between 1965 and 1985 (Musa 1985). 
While the growth in demand for software has been rapid, actual software devel- 
opment is increasing much more slowly. Musa (1985) estimates that U.S. software 
production capacity increased about eighteenfold between 1965 and 1985. Such a 
severe supply-demand imbalance is cause for serious concern. If it persists, it can 
have a debilitating effect, not only on the fledgling software industry but also on 
technological and economic development in many other areas of the economy. 
The challenge posed to the software industry is to enhance the productivity of 
software development. An important prerequisite for accomplishing this is to gain an 
understanding of those factors that have a significant impact on software productivity. 
It is in pursuit of this goal that this article was written. Specifically, our objective is 
to provide a dynamic perspective of software productivity, 
influencing it throughout the lifecycle of a software project. 
examining those factors 
System dynamics modeling of project management 
The significance and applicability of the feedback systems concepts of system dynam- 
ics to project management has been substantiated by a large number of studies. One 
of the earliest is Roberts’s (1964) published doctoral dissertation, which involved the 
development of a comprehensive system dynamics model of R&D project manage- 
ment. The model traces the full lifecycle of a single R&D project and incorporates the 
interactions between the R&D product, the firm, and the customer. Nay (1965) and 
Kelly (1970) extended Roberts’s work in their research on multiproject environments. 
Richardson (1982) took a different tack, focusing on the development group. His 
model reproduces the dynamics of a development group over an eight-year period as 
a continuous stream of products are developed and placed into production. The 
model traces the number of products under development, the use of resources re- 
quired, and the product development time. 
Several other models have been developed that emphasize the role of rework in 
project management. Cooper (1980), for example, describes a large system dynamics 
study of cost overruns in a shipbuilding contract for the U.S. Navy. The study showed 
that the rework required by frequent design changes imposed by the Navy was the 
major contributing factor to a $500-million overrun. Undiscovered rework was also 
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the focus of the simple R&D models in Roberts (1978) and Richardson and Pugh 
(1 981). 
While the bulk of the system dynamics modeling work in project management has 
been devoted to the R&D environment, the applicability of the methodology to the 
domain of software production has also been suggested, for example, by Graham 
(1982); Lehman (1978); Putnam (1980); and Snyder and Cox (1985). Perhaps this 
should come as no surprise, since the environments of R&D project work and of 
software development have much in common: 
In both cases, heavy expenditures are required in order to produce future benefits that 
are very uncertain in their magnitude. . . . The stages of research and development are 
similar in many respects to the stages of software analysis and design. First, the deter- 
mination of what the system is to do (specification of outputs and inputs) is very ill- 
defined, making the estimation of the time and cost of its development uncertain (like 
the research stage). Second, the specification of how inputs are to be converted to 
outputs (file specification, programming) is easier to estimate (like the development 
state). These similarities suggest that a good many managerial practices and procedures 
from the latter be applied to the former. (Gehring and Pooch 1977) 
In the remaining sections of this article, we demonstrate how the system dynamics 
approach to modeling R&D project management can be extended to the software 
project domain. 
A system dynamics model of software development 
Our study of software productivity is being conducted within the context of a much 
broader research effort to study, gain insight into, and make predictions about the 
dynamics of the entire software development process. A major part of this effort has 
been devoted to developing a comprehensive system dynamics computer model of 
software development. 
The model was developed on the basis of 27 field interviews of software project 
managers in five organizations. These were supplemented by empirical findings gath- 
ered from the literature. 
Scope of the model 
The domain of our model is that of medium-sized projects generating between 15,000 
and ~00,000 lines of code in contrast to either small one-programmer-type projects 
or superlarge projects involving hundreds of software professionals working over a 
period of several years. Within this domain, our study focuses entirely on the devel- 
opment processes (designing, coding, reviewing, and testing) of software production 
and does not examine the operation and maintenance phases, which follow devel- 
opment. The requirements definition phase, which precedes development, is also 
excluded from consideration, because we are concerned primarily with the software 
development organization, that is, with project managers and software development 
professionals and their policies, decisions, and actions. The definition of user re- 
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quirements is excluded because, in many environments, this activity lies beyond the 
control of the software development group (McGowan and McHenry 1980). 
Model sectors 
The model’s formulation integrates the multiple functions of the software develop- 
ment process, including both the management-type functions (e.g., planning, con- 
trolling, and staffing) and the software production-type activities (e.g., designing, 
coding, reviewing, and testing). Figure 1 depicts the model’s four major sectors, 
namely: (1) the Human Resource Management Sector; (2) the Software Production 
Sector; (3) the Controlling Sector; and (4) the Planning Sector. 
Because the model is quite comprehensive and highly detailed (156 level equa- 
tions), it is infeasible to explain it fully in this article. We therefore limit our descrip- 
tion to a high-level overview of the four sectors. The software productivity structure, 
which is our focus here, is discussed in detail later. (For a full description of the 
model’s structure and mathematical formulation, see Abdel-Hamid 1984; Abdel- 
Hamid and Madnick 1989.) 
The Human Resource Management Sector captures the hiring, training, assimila- 
tion, and transfer of the project’s human resources. Such actions are not carried out 
in vacuum but, as Figure 1 suggests, are affected by the other sectors. For example, 
the project’s hiring rate is a function of the workforce level needed to complete the 
project on a certain planned completion date. Similarly, the availability of workforce 
has direct bearing on the allocation of workers among the different software produc- 
tion activities in the Software Production Sector. 
Fig. 1. Overview of I 
the model’s four 
sectors 
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The four primary activities in the Software Production Sector are development, 
quality assurance, rework, and testing. The development activity comprises both the 
design and coding of the software. As the software is developed, it is also reviewed 
to detect errors. for example, by structured walkthroughs. Errors detected through 
such quality assurance activities are then reworked. Not all errors get detected and 
reworked, however. Some escape detection until the system testing phase. 
As progress is made, it is reported. A comparison of where the project is versus 
where it should be according to plan is a control-type activity captured within the 
Controlling Sector. Once an assessment of the project’s status is made, it becomes an 
important input to the planning function. 
In the Planning Sector, initial project estimates are made at the beginning of the 
project, and then these estimates are reviewed, when necessary, throughout the proj- 
ect’s life. For example, to handle a project that is perceived to be behind schedule, 
plans can be revised to (among other things] hire more people, extend the schedule, 
or do a little of both. 
Modeling the dynamics of software development productivity 
Defining the uni t  of software development productivity 
Productivity may be expressed in tasks per man-day. In principle, a task may be any 
arbitrary unit for measuring a software project’s size-it could be defined in terms of 
lines of code, function points, modules, or input/output files. From a practical point 
of view, though, defining a task in terms of delivered source instructions (DSI) is the 
most attractive alternative (Boehm 1981), and this is the definition we chose to use. 
Delivered source instructions are the actual computer-programming source instruc- 
tions in the completed product, including job control language, format statements, 
and data definitions. They exclude comments and nondelivered support software like 
test programs. To model different project environments, we fixed the value of the 
nominal potential productivity parameter to be one task per man-day and adjusted 
the definition of a task. 
Let us provide an example to illustrate how the definition of a task for an organi- 
zation may be determined. Assume two different software development organizations, 
ORG-1 and ORG-2, have each just completed the development of some software 
project, PROJ-1 and PROJ-2, respectively. Further assume that the two projects are 
different in nature except that they are both exactly 8,000 delivered source instruc- 
tions (DSI) in size. Suppose that in ORG-1 the development effort consumed a total 
of 400 man-days, while in ORG-2 the development effort took only 200 man-days. If, 
for the purposes of simplification, we assume that actual productivity is equal to 
potential productivity, we may conclude that the potential productivity in ORG-1 is 
half that of ORG-2. (The concepts of potential and actual productivity are explained 
in detail in the next section.) The nominal potential productivity parameter is set, in 
both cases, at one task per man-day. But, to model these different project environ- 
ments, we would define a task to be 20 DSI for ORG-1 and 40 DSI for ORG-2. Thus, 
the 8,000 DSI PROJ-1 would be defined as a 400-task project, while the 8,000 DSI 
Abdel-Hamid and Madnick: Software Productivity 97 
PROJ-2 would be defined as a 200-task project. In other words, a task is defined as 
the potential daily output of an experienced and “up-to-speed” worker. 
Potential versus actual productivity 
Figure 2 presents the portion of the model in which actual software development 
productivity is formulated. This structure is based, in part, on a model of group 
productivity proposed by the psychologist Ivan Steiner [ 1972): 
Actual productivity = Potential productivity - Losses due to faulty process 
where “losses due to faulty process” refers to a group’s communication and motiva- 
tion losses. Steiner (1972) explains: 
Potential productivity is defined as the maximum level of productivity that can occur 
when an individual or group employs its funds of resources to meet the task demands 
of a work situation. It is the level of productivity that will be attained if the individual 
or group makes the best possible use of its resources (that is, if there is no loss of 
productivity due to faulty process). . . . Potential productivity can be inferred from a 
thorough analysis of task demands and available resources, for it depends only upon 
these two types of variables. 
Actual productivity, what the individual or group does in fact accomplish, rarely 
equals potential productivity. Individuals and groups usually fail to make the best 
possible use of their available resources. Problems of coordination and/or motivation 
are responsible for inadequacies in process, and for consequent losses in productivity. 
POTENTIAL PRODUCTIVITY. According to Steiner, potential productivity POTPRD is a 
function of two groups of factors, namely, the nature of the task and the project team’s 
resources. Much of the research on software productivity has focused on identifying 
and investigating such factors. Table 1 summarizes the findings of a number of studies. 
Notice that wnile most of the factors in rable 1 do vary from organization to 
organization (for example, availability of software tools, personnel capability, and 
computer hardware characteristics) and from project to project within a single orga- 
nization (for instance, programming language, database size, and product complexity), 
Table 1. Factors 
affecting software 
productivity 
Researchers Nature of task Group resources 
Scott and Simmons (1974) Programming language, quality of ex- 
ternal documentation 
Availability of programming practices, 
availability of programming tools, pro- 
grammer experience 
Chrysler (1978) Source language, computer hardware, Programmer characteristics, organiza- 
problem characteristics tional characteristics, programming 
mode 
Boehm (1981) Product complexity, required reliabil- 
ity, memory constraints, database size 
Software tools used, turnaround time, 
personnel experience 
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they tend to remain constant throughout the development lifecycle of any single 
project. From our viewpoint, this observation is quite significant. It means that in 
studying the dynamics of software productivity during the lifecycle of a software 
project, such factors can be assumed to remain constant. In the model, such factors 
are captured through the nominal potential productivity parameters, which represent 
the maximum level of software development productivity that can be attained for a 
specific project within a specific organization and for a specific employee type, 
whether new or experienced, at any point in the project. 
Specifically, the average nominal potential productivity ANPPRD for the workforce 
as a whole is the weighted average of two nominal potential productivity parameters, 
one to represent the average nominal potential productivity of the experienced staff 
member NPWPEX and the second to represent that of the average newly hired em- 
ployee NPWPNE. The latter is set to be half that of experienced staff members (Okada 
1982: Thadhani 1984). The average nominal potential productivity changes through- 
out the lifecycle of the software project as the workforce experience mix changes. 
A second dynamic factor affecting potential productivity is the increase in project 
know-how due to project-specific learning. As a project proceeds, project members 
learn to do their job better. The learning curve effect is formulated as the S-shaped 
(Weinberg 1982) multiplier to potential productivity due to learning MPPTPD. It 
starts with a value of 1 at the beginning of the project and peaks at 1.25 towards the 
end of the development period (Aron 1976). 
LOSSES D U E  TO FAULTY PROCESS. As defined above, potential productivity is the level 
of productivity attained when an individual or group makes the best possible use of 
available resources. Actual productivity, however, rarely equals potential productivity 
because of losses caused by communication and motivation overheads. 
In the model, software development productivity SVDPRD is formulated as a prod- 
uct of potential productivity POTPRD and the multiplier to productivity due to 
communication and motivation losses MPDMCL. In the absence of any communica- 
tion and motivation losses, the multiplier assumes a value of 1, in which case actual 
productivity would be equal to potential productivity. However, losses will occur, 
and these will drive the multiplier to values that are less than 1. 
The multiplier to productivity due to communication and motivation losses 
MPDMCL represents the average productive fraction of a man-day. For example, if 
the average communication and motivation losses amounted to three man-hours lost 
in a nominal eight-hour workday, then the value of the muliplier would be %, or 
0.625. 
Motivation factors determine the fraction of a man-day devoted to project work. 
Since time is often lost on personal matters, coffee breaks, and other non-project- 
related activities, this fraction will usually have a value less than 1 .  Communication 
losses take further cuts out of this fraction, as explained in detail below. 
MOTIVATION LOSSES. To discern the dynamic effects of motivation losses on produc- 
tivity, we distinguish between those factors that tend to remain constant during the 
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life of any one project and those that change throughout the project lifecycle. Many 
of the motivational factors discussed in the literature, such as possibility for growth 
and advancement, level of responsibility, and salary, are factors that characterize the 
overall organizational setting and climate. In our formulation, such static factors are 
incorporated in the definition of the potential productivity parameters. 
According to Bartol and Martin (1982), “Another motivation approach which is 
particularly appropriate to the data-processing area is goal setting.” These authors 
suggest that project goals and schedules play an important motivational role through- 
out the life of a software project. This was corroborated by Boehm (1981), who found 
that schedule pressures and project deadlines can significantly affect the project 
members’ slack time, which is the time lost on off-project activities such as coffee 
breaks, personal business, and non-project communication. 
The nominal slack time is captured in the model by the nominal fraction of a man- 
day on the project NFMDPJ, which represents the fraction of daily hours allocated to 
project-related work in the absence of unusual schedule pressures. In designating a 
value for this parameter, one can draw upon a large volume of research findings. The 
findings are clustered within the 50-70 percent range: 50 percent (Brooks 1978); 50- 
60 percent (Pooch and Gehring 1980); 60 percent (Thadhani 1984); and 70 percent 
(Boehm 1981). On the basis of these findings, the value of NFMDPJ is set in the model 
at 60 percent. That is, in an eight-hour day, a full-time employee spends, on the 
average, 0.6 x 8 = 4.8 hours on project-related work. 
This loss in productivity does not remain constant throughout the life of the project. 
The motivational effects of schedule pressure can move the actual fraction of a man- 
day on project AFMDPJ to values both higher (under positive schedule pressure) and 
lower (under negative schedule pressure) than the nominal value of 0.6. 
POSITIVE SCHEDULE PRESSURES. Positive schedule pressures can arise whenever the 
project is perceived to be behind schedule. When confronted with such a situation, 
software developers tend to work harder by allocating more man-hours to the project 
in an attempt to compensate for the perceived “delinquency” and bring the project 
back on schedule (DePree 1984; Ibrahim 1978). In one experiment, Boehm (1981) 
found that the number of man-hours can increase by as much as 100 percent. He 
asserts that most of the gains are achieved by reallocating, or compressing, people’s 
slack time. In other words, under increased schedule pressure, people tend to spend 
less time on off-project activities such as personal business and non-project com- 
munication. This increases the daily man-hours allocated to the project. 
In addition to partly compressing their slack time, workers may also work overtime. 
For example, by working 1 2  hours per day at 80 percent efficiency, a team member 
allocates 9.6 hours to the project-double the nominal 4.8 hours. In fact, by further 
compressing the slack time (say to 10 or 15 percent) and further increasing the 
overtime hours, an increase in project man-hours per day of more than 100 percent 
could be achieved. 
To recapitulate, when a project is perceived to be behind schedule, people tend to 
work harder to bring it back on schedule. They do so by compressing their slack time 
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or by working overtime. But what if such a situation persists? Would workers be 
willing to work harder indefinitely? The answer, based on common sense and con- 
firmed by our field study results, is overwhelmingly no. Our findings indicate that 
there is a threshold for how long employees are willing to work at an above-normal 
rate. Workers savor their slack time, and they typically will not tolerate a prolonged 
deprivation of such “breathers.” Compressed slack time exhausts them (psychologi- 
cally more so than physically) in the sense that it cuts into their tolerance level for 
continued overworking. Exhaustion (EXHLEV) and its effect on the work rate are 
portrayed explicitly in the model, as shown in Figure 2. 
NEGATIVE SCHEDULE PRESSURES. Negative schedule pressures arise on those occasions 
when a project is perceived to be ahead of schedule, that is, when the total man-days 
remaining in the project’s budget exceed what project members perceive to be needed 
to complete the project. This happens, for example, when management initially 
overestimates a project’s complexity. 
When project members perceive some excess time in the schedule, some of this 
excess time will tend to get absorbed by workers in the form of goldplating or 
“underwork” (DePree 1984; Ibrahim 1978). For example, “If the software cost or 
schedule estimate for meeting a milestone is higher than the ideal, Parkinson’s Law 
indicates that people will use the extra time for . . . personal activities, catching up 
on the mail, etc.” (Boehm 1981). 
Analogous to the case of positive schedule pressure, where a threshold exists on 
how much overwork people could tolerate, there are limits on how much “fat” 
employees would be willing, or allowed, to absorb. Excesses beyond these limits will 
be translated into cuts in the project’s schedule. 
LOSSES DUE TO COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD. The value of the actual fraction of a man- 
day on project AFMDPJ captures the losses in productivity due to motivational factors 
only. Additional losses in productivity due to communication overhead may be 
incurred. 
What is communication overhead? To answer this question, consider the differences 
between developing software using a single person and developing it using a team of 
people. There are at least two differences. First, when software is developed by a 
single person, there is no time “lost” on project-related human communication. When, 
on the other hand, a team of software professionals develops software, communication 
overhead results: 
It is necessary that each individual spend part of his time communicating with each of 
the other team members. For example, the designer must confer with the coder to 
resolve any questions the coder may have about the design; both of these must talk to 
the individual testing the code to give him the benefit of their experience with the 
program: each of these must talk to the documentor to assure that the documentation 
is proper and complete; and so on. (Tausworthe 1977) 
Second, the amount of work itself usually increases when software is developed 
by a team rather than by a single person. For example, the amount of production 
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documentation typically increases. In a one-person environment the programmer 
could get away with sketchy notes to merely augment his or her “mental documen- 
tation’’; this would be intolerable in a team environment (Tausworthe 1977). 
Communication overhead may be defined as the drop in productivity of the average 
team member caused by the overhead incurred in communicating, orally as well as 
in writing, with others on the project. The nature of the relation between communi- 
cation overhead and team size has been investigated by several authors. It is widely 
held that communication overhead increases in proportion to nz, where n is the size 
of the team (Brooks 1978; Mills 1976; Scott and Simmons 1974; Shooman 1983; 
Zelkowitz 1978). 
Actual versus perceived productivity 
Decisions made in any organizational setting are based on what information is actually 
available to the decision makers. Often, this available information is inaccurate. 
Apparent conditions may be far removed from the actual or true state, depending on 
the information flows that are being used and the amount of time lag and distortion 
in these information flows (Forrester 1961). 
True productivity of a software project team is a good example of a variable that is 
often difficult to assess. To know what the true value of productivity is at a particular 
point requires accurate knowledge regarding the rates of accomplishment of project 
work and resources expended over that period of time. However, software is basically 
an intangible product during most of the development process. “It is difficult to 
measure performance in programming. . . . It is difficult to evaluate the status of 
intermediate work such as undebugged programs or design specification and their 
potential value to the complete project.” (Mills 1983) 
How, then, is progress measured in a software project? Our own field study findings 
corroborate those reported in the literature, namely, that progress, especially in the 
earlier phases of software development, is typically measured by the actual expen- 
diture of resources compared with the budgeted amounts rather than by some count 
of accomplishments (DeMarco 1982). Baber (1982) explains: 
It is essentially impossible for the programmer to estimate the fraction of the program 
completed. What is 45 percent of a program? Worse yet, what is 45 percent of three 
programs? How is he to guess whether a program is 40 percent or 50 percent complete? 
The easiest way for the programmer to estimate such a figure is to divide the amount 
of time actually spent on the task to.date by the time budgeted for that task. Only when 
the program is almost finished or when the allocated time budget is almost used up 
will he be able to recognize that the calculated figure is wrong. 
When progress in software development is measured solely by the expenditure of 
resources, status reporting ends up being nothing more than an echo of the original 
plan. Under such circumstances, man-days perceived still needed for new tasks 
MDPNNT, which represents the amount of work still to be done, is simply equal to 
man-days perceived remaining for new tasks MDPRNT, which represents the bud- 
geted resources remaining. This notion of productivity is captured in the model by 
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the variable projected development productivity PJDPRD, where 
TSKPRM 
MDPRNT PJDPRD = 
and TSKPRM is the value of tasks perceived remaining. 
As the project advances towards its final stages, work accomplishments become 
relatively more visible and project members become increasingly more able to per- 
ceive how productive the workforce has actually been. As a result, perceived pro- 
ductivity gradually ceases to be a function of projected productivity and is determined 
instead on the basis of actual tasks developed. That is, perceived development pro- 
ductivity PRDPRD approaches the value of average development productivity 
AVGPRD, where 
Cumulative tasks developed 
Cumulative man-days expended AVGPRD = 
The shifting between these alternative schemes for assessing software productivity 
can be obtained by appropriately adjusting the value of the weighting factor WTPJDP 
in the equation for perceived development productivity: 
PRDPRD = PJDPRD * WTPJDP + AVGPRD * (1 - WTPJDP) 
As the project progresses, the weighting factor WTPJDP gradually decreases from a 
value of 1 at the start of the project until it eventually becomes zero as the project 
approaches its final stages of development. The rate at which this happens is a product 
of two factors, namely, the rate of expenditure of resources and the rate of product 
development (Baber 1982). To accomplish this in the model, the weighting factor 
WTPJDP is formulated as the product of two multipliers: the multiplier to productivity 
weight due to resource expenditures, and the multiplier to productivity weight due 
to development. The shapes of the multipliers are functions of programming envi- 
ronment factors, such as the milestones used, the sophistication of programming 
tools, and the reporting procedures. 
Model behavior 
The EXAMPLE software project 
We will use an EXAMPLE software project as the prototype for conducting model 
experimentation on software productivity. 
Project EXAMPLE’S size is selected to be 64,000 DSI. The value of the nominal 
potential productivity for the average experienced staff member is set to one task per 
man-day by definition, and the value of a task is 60 DSI. Thus, EXAMPLE’S size in 
terms of tasks is 64,000/60 = 1,067. 
At the start of a software project, management must decide how much labor and 
time to allocate to the project. Such decisions are based not on the project’s real size 
but rather on what its size is perceived to be, since the real size is often not known 
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at the start. We assume that at its initiation, EXAMPLE’S size was underestimated by 
33 percent: the project was perceived to be only 0.67 * 64,000 = 42,880 DSI in size. 
This value is then used to estimate effort and schedule. One popular estimation 
tool is the COCOMO model (Boehm 1981). Using COCOMO produces the following 
estimates for EXAMPLE: 
\/ Totol workforce in 
.. - - 
_ _ _ _ _ L - - - ~  
*/ .~ -
Development effort = 2,359 man-days 
Development time = 296 days 
Finally, the project’s average staffing level is determined by dividing development 
man-days by development time, yielding a value of eight people. Not all eight people 
will be on board at the beginning of the project, however. Most software projects start 
with a small core of designers, and as the project proceeds, the workforce builds up 
to higher levels. In EXAMPLE, the project starts with a core of four experienced 
software personnel. 
With these things accomplished, our model initialization procedure is complete. 
Figure 3 depicts the model’s base case run over the 440 days actually required to 
complete the project. Four key measures of EXAMPLE’S progress are shown: perceived 
job size in man-days, the total workforce level, cumulative man-days, and scheduled 
completion time. 
As the job progresses and the scope of the effort becomes clearer, the perceived job 
size rises, ultimately leading to revisions in the scheduled completion date from its 
initial estimate of 296 days to its final value of 440 days. 
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Actualipotential productivity gap 
Figure 4 depicts the dynamic behavior pattern of factors determining potential pro- 
ductivity. Note the initial drop in average nominal potential productivity. This is 
caused by the buildup of the workforce from the small core of experienced people to 
a larger team of both experienced and (initially) inexperienced personnel. This drop 
is reversed as the newly hired team members are assimilated into the project and 
become experienced team members. 
Initially. potential productivity follows the average nominal potential productivity 
curve. But, as the project proceeds, the workforce's potential productivity rises be- 
cause of the increase in project-specific know-how gained through the learning-curve 
effect. 
Figure 5 demonstrates the difference between potential productivity and actual 
productivity. There are two kinds of productivity losses incurred on the project. The 
first class of losses accounts for the gap between the potential productivity and actual 
productivity curves, while the second causes the additional drop of the average 
development productivity curve. 
The first class of losses involves motivation and communication losses incurred on 
the project. As was explained earlier, communication overhead includes both oral 
and written communication (documentation) and increases proportional to the square 
of the workforce size. Motivation losses, on the other hand, are captured by the 
variable actual fraction of man-day on project AFMDPJ. Notice in Figure 6 that during 
the first half of the project's lifecycle, this variable assumes a steady value of 0.6, 
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indicating that the team members are averaging 0.6 * 8 = 4.8 hours per day on the 
project. Near the end of the development phase, though, a “spike” of overwork occurs. 
To understand the causes of this behavior, recall that when project EXAMPLE was 
started, its size was underestimated by 33 percent. Underestimating the project’s size 
leads, in turn, to an underestimate of the required effort in man-days. This shortage 
in man-days does not, however, become visible until later in the development phase. 
When this happens, the team reacts by working harder in an attempt to bring the 
project back on schedule. Working harder translates into the higher values of actual 
fraction of man-day on project. 
Under the intense pressure of an imminent deadline, actual fraction of man-day on 
project may exceed 100 percent because of dramatically reduced slack time and 
increased overtime work. This occurs during this development “spike,” which is also 
reflected in the corresponding rapid rise in actual productivity. In fact, as shown in 
Figure 5, in this example, actual productivity exceeds potential productivity at the 
height of this peak, as the average worker contributes more than eight nominal 
productive man-hours per day. 
Notice in Figure 6 that even as the project members are working harder, the shortage 
in man-days keeps rising because, as the development phase approaches its final 
stages, the degree of visibility increases rapidly, exposing even more previously 
undetected man-day shortages. Thus, although working harder, project members may 
appear to be falling behind because previously undetected tasks are being discovered 
faster than tasks are being completed. To highlight the significance of the workforce’s 
contributions, we plotted a curve (labeled with asterisks) that depicts what the level 
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of the perceived shortage in man-days would have been if project members had 
maintained their normal (lower) work rate. 
As was explained earlier, project members are typically unwilling to maintain an 
above-normal work rate indefinitely. Thus, as the backlog problem persists, it even- 
tually overwhelms the workforce's intensified effort and, around day 300, arrange- 
ments are made to handle those remaining shortages through adjustments to both 
the project's man-days budget and its schedule. These adjustments can be seen in 
Figure 3. 
In addition to the motivation and communication losses incurred, a further drain 
on a project team's productivity occurs as errors are committed and then need to be 
reworked. Thus, even though the instantaneous actual productivity might be a re- 
spectable X tasks per man-day, the average development productivity will be lower, 
since some of the X tasks developed must be redone. Rework, then, explains the gap 
between the two types of actual productivity shown in Figure 5, instantaneous and 
average. 
Perceivedlactual productivity gap 
The discrepancy between perceivec. and actual productivity is demonstrated in Figure 
7 .  As expected, in the early stages of the project the general pattern of the perceived 
productivity curve follows that of the projected productivity curve. Notice that while 
actual productivity (and potential productivity) are dropping slightly because of the 
buildup of newly hired members, perceived productivity is rising slightly. 
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This initial rise in perceived productivity needs some explanation. Recall that, in 
the initial phases of the project, perceived productivity is a function of the ratio of 
tasks perceived remaining to man-days remaining. Recall also that EXAMPLE’S size 
was initially underestimated by 33 percent. When additional tasks are gradually 
discovered during development, they do not necessarily trigger an adjustment to the 
project’s man-day estimate, as we saw in Figure 3. Only when new tasks are discov- 
ered in “chunks” of significant size will project members go to the trouble of formally 
updating the cost estimates (Abdel-Hamid 1984). The determining factor is not the 
absolute size of the discovered tasks but their size relative to the amount of effort 
perceived remaining. For example, while a 100-man-day task discovered at the be- 
ginning of a 100,000-man-day project might not trigger any adjustments in the proj- 
ect’s estimates, it would be quite likely to spur significant changes if discovered at 
the end of the development phase, when only 50 man-days remain. 
When increases in the project’s scope due to the discovery of new tasks are not 
fully reflected as increases in the project’s man-days, the value of projected devel- 
opment productivity, and thus perceived productivity, rises. It is as if management 
were anticipating the coming need to reduce slack time. 
As the project advances toward its final stages, and accomplishments become 
relatively more visible, project members become increasingly more able to perceive 
how productive the workforce has actually been. As a result, perceived productivity 
ceases to be a function of projected productivity and is determined instead on the 
basis of actual accomplishments, or average development productivity. As this hap- 
pens, the gap between perceived productivity and average development productivity 
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gradually narrows and is eventually closed. As noted earlier, because of the discovery 
of previously undetected tasks near the end of the development phase, the perceived 
productivity drops even while actual productivity is still rising. In other words, the 
harder the team works, achieving higher actual productivity, the faster previously 
undetected tasks are discovered. These additional tasks increase the amount of work 
left, partly canceling out the effect of tasks completed and leading to lower perceived 
productivitv. 
Concluding remarks 
Software development productivity has become a critically important topic. Our 
objective in this article was to study the dynamics of software productivity during 
the development lifecycle of a software project. Our investigation discerned three 
forms of productivity: potential, actual, and perceived. This conceptual dissection of 
productivity provides a useful lens for investigating two important but distinct sets 
of managerial concerns: losses in the efficiency of software production, and losses in 
the effectiveness of managerial control. 
Efficiency of software production (potential versus actual) 
Losses in the efficiency of software production are incurred as a result of communi- 
cation and motivation faulty processes. The larger the losses, the larger is the 
gap between potential productivity (for a particular project setting) and actual 
productivity. 
The significant impact that communication overhead can have on software devel- 
opment projects is perhaps best illustrated by what Frederick Brooks called Brooks’s 
Law, namely, that adding more people to a late software project can make it later 
because of the increase in the communication and coordination overheads (Brooks 
1978). Brooks’s insights are based on his experience in the development of IBM’s OS/ 
360 operating system and are therefore intended to apply to what he called “jumbo 
systems programming projects.” We have investigated the applicability of Brooks’s 
Law to medium-sized application-type software projects (Abdel-Hamid 1989). We 
found that, for such projects, adding manpower to a late project always increases the 
development cost in man-days, but it does not necessarily cause the project to finish 
later. In particular, we found that Brooks’s Law applies only when the workforce 
additions are made quite late, near the end of the lifecycle. In any case, communi- 
cation losses can exact a heavy toll on software development projects. 
Project managers also must guard against motivation losses. For example, overes- 
timating project resources can lead to significant losses in productivity due to gold- 
plating and increases in nonproductive slack time activities. In our investigation of 
the common scheduling practice of using “safety factors” to inflate initial project 
estimates (Abdel-Hamid and Madnick 1986), the results indicated that such practices 
lead to larger and more costly projects than would have resulted had a safety factor 
not been used. 
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Effectiveness of managerial control (actual versus perceived) 
Losses in the effectiveness of managerial control are primarily caused by the poor 
level of progress visibility experienced in the earlier phases of software development. 
As a result, a significant discrepancy can arise between managerial perceptions and 
reality. 
One consequence of this deficiency is the infamous 90 percent syndrome, which 
Baber (1982) describes as follows: “Estimates of the fraction of the work completed 
[increase] as originally planned until a level of about 80-90 percent is reached. The 
programmer’s individual estimates then increase only very slowly until the task is 
actually completed.” 
As was explained earlier, measuring progress in the initial phases of a project by 
the rate of expenditure of resources causes status reporting to be nothing more than 
an echo of the project’s plan. This creates the illusion that the project is on target. 
However, as the project approaches its final stages-when 80-90 percent of the 
resources are consumed-discrepancies between the percent of tasks accomplished 
and the percent of resources expended become increasingly apparent. Furthermore, 
project members become increasingly able to perceive how productive the workforce 
has actually been. This results in a better appreciation of the amount of required 
effort actually remaining, often leading to increased schedule pressure or adjustments 
to the schedule. 
Strategies for improving project visibility were investigated by Abdel-Hamid (1988). 
He found that a modest improvement in progress visibility in the early phases, using 
such techniques as project reviews and Computer-Aided Software Engineering (CASE) 
tools, can significantly reduce the 90 percent syndrome. 
Implications 
In order to address effectively the need to improve software development productiv- 
ity, one must understand its various forms and the factors that influence them. This 
article provides a comprehensive structure for such an investigation as well as im- 
portant preliminary findings. 
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